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Cameras in Court: Estes v. Texas and Florida's
One Year Pilot Program*
JOSEPH A. BOYD, JR.**
This article discusses Florida's experiment with cameras in
state courtrooms in the context of the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Estes v. Texas. Competing factors
of a defendant's right to a fair and public trial, the first amend-
ment rights of the media and the necessity of maintaining an
independent judiciary are considered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic political and governmental revelations of recent
years have inspired a renewed interest in public affairs. Citizens are
becoming increasingly conscious of their right to be informed about
the activities of their local, state and federal governments.' Public
institutions are responding to this growing citizen awareness by be-
coming more open to the public view. In Florida, the Sunshine Law'
has ensured public access to many governmental proceedings pre-
viously conducted in private. The Florida Constitution has been
amended 3 to require public officials and candidates for public office
to make full disclosure of their financial interests. Citizens' groups
are working for the passage of lobbying disclosure laws.
* Thanks to David M. Maloney for his research assistance. Mr. Maloney is a research
aide at the Supreme Court of Florida, a member of the Florida Bar and an honors graduate
of the Florida State University College of Law.
** Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida. J.D., University of Miami; LL.D., Piedmont
College. Justice Boyd expresses no views as to the decision the Supreme Court of Florida will
make on full review of the results of the one year experiment.
1. See Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977) for
a discussion of the constitutional right of access to information which the government may
be unwilling to divulge.
2. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1977).
3. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (amended 1976).
4. See FLA. H.B. 313, 1977 Reg. Sess. & FLA. S.B. 558, 1977 Reg. Sess.
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The courts cannot escape the new public scrutiny, and one
response of the bench and bar has been to give new consideration
to Canon 3A(7)1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,6 which prohibits
the broadcasting of most judicial proceedings.' Several states' are
now allowing the television media access to the courtroom. In Flor-
ida, the state supreme court has undertaken a bold experiment to
see if television and photographic cameras can be present in the
courtroom without disturbing the decorum of the proceeding and
without depriving a defendant of his right to a fair trial.
On May 21, 1975, the Supreme Court of Florida granted,9 in
part, a petition by the Post-Newsweek stations of Florida. The sta-
tions had petitioned the court to adopt a substitute for Canon
3A(7)I0 of the state's Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that
5. 58 A.B.A.J. 1207, 1208 (1972). See note 10 infra for the text of Canon 3A(7) as adopted
in Florida. The Florida Bar and the American Bar Association have adopted identical ver-
sions of the Canon.
Canon 3A(7) was adopted by the House of Delegates, the governing body of the American
Bar 'Association, to replace Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
In its original form, Canon 35 denounced the taking of photographs and the broadcast
of court proceedings as "calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings,
degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public
. . . ." 62 A.B.A. REP. 1123, 1134-35 (1937). The Canon was an overreaction to the publicity
and broadcast of the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby.
For a good history of the Canon see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 596 (1965)(appendix to
opinion of Harlan, J., concurring). Although Canon 3A(7) is written in language much less
restrictive than its predecessor, Canon 35, it has been charged that it bars meaningful televi-
sion coverage of court proceedings just as effectively. Wilson, Justice in Living Color: The
Case for Courtroom Television, 60 A.B.A.J. 294 (1974).
6. 58 A.B.A.J. 207 (1972), adopted by the ABA House of Delegates to replace the
Canons of Judicial Ethics.
7. See note 10 infra for the limited circumstances under which Canon 3A(7) allows the
televising of court proceedings.
8. Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Texas and Washington have allowed such ac-
cess. Associated Press Managing Editors Association Freedom of Information Report,
Cameras in the Courtroom: How to Get 'em There (available from Hu Blonk, Freedom of
Information Committee, Associated Press Managing Editors Association, Wenatchee World,
Wenatchee, Washington). See, e.g., In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 132 Col. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
9. See In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct,
327 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976).
10. (7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or tak-
ing photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during
sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evi-
dence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial adminis-
tration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive,
ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate
court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the
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a judge, in keeping with his adjudicative responsibility, prohibit the
broadcasting, televising, recording and photographing of judicial
proceedings in courtrooms, except in certain specified circumstan-
ces." The court declined to adopt the substitute, but it agreed to
reexamine the canon with an eye toward modification.
On January 28, 1976, a second decision was handed down by
the court in the Post-Newsweek case.'2 It authorized Judge Ben C.
Willis, Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit in Florida, to
allow television coverage of one criminal trial and one civil trial,
subject to the requirement that the parties, jurors and witnesses
consent to the televising of their participation in the trials. The
decision was supplemented by a series of decisions which allowed
still photography in the courtroom and which increased the number
of judges with authority to permit electronic and photographic
media in the courtroom for the transmission of judicial proceedings
to the public."
When the required consent of the trial participants proved im-
possible to obtain, the court decided to conduct a one year state-
wide pilot program." The program allows the media to televise and
photograph any state judicial proceeding-criminal, civil or appel-
late- subject only to standards regulating physical presence in the
courtroom and reasonable directions of the presiding judge. The
carefully delineated standards promulgated by the supreme court
govern the number and location of cameras and personnel, sound
and light criteria, movement during the proceedings and alteration
of the courtroom. 5 In the interest of the right to counsel and the
dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or
recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and
reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has
been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in
educational institutions.
In re the Florida Bar-Code of Judicial Conduct, 281 So. 2d 21, 25 (1973)(per curiam).
11. Id. §§ 7(a)-(c).
12. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct,
327 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976).
13. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct,
337 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 1976) (per curiam); In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for
Change in Code of Judicial Conduct, 347 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1977).
14. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct,
347 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1977).
15. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct,
347 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, note 20 infra; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall ...have the right . . . to be heard in person, by counsel, or
both .... "
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confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, the court prohib-
its audio pickup or broadcast of courtroom conferences between
attorneys and their clients, between co-counsel and between counsel
and the judge. The use of media material produced through the
program as evidence in a court of law is prohibited, as is media-
initiated appellate review of court orders ruling on the standards. 7
At the end of the pilot program year, all media participants in the
program and all participating judges are to furnish a report of their
experience under the program to the court so that it may make a
decision on the proposal to modify Canon 3A(7).
Although the promulgated standards may not have given the
media the latitude it deserves, 8 the decisions of the court mark the
first significant step in allowing the electronic and photographic
media into the courtroom in Florida. 9 At the same time, the court's
pilot program calls into question two fundamental constitutional
guarantees: the right to a fair trial20 and freedom of the press.2' The
court's decision to allow television into the courtroom, even tempo-
rarily, sets off a complex interaction among three competing factors:
the defendant's right to a fair and public trial,22 the first amendment
rights of the media, 2 and the necessity of maintaining an indepen-
dent judiciary. This article will examine that interaction within the
framework of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Estes v. Texas,2 14 the dominant impediment to television
in the courtroom since 1965.
17. The prohibition on certain appellate review was for the purpose of ensuring that trials
likely to be televised would not be delayed beyond the program year so that there would be
enough data for in-depth evaluation. 347 So. 2d at 406. Many have criticized the ban on
television in the courtroom because of lack of data on which to intelligently decide the issue.
See D. GILLMOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1966).
18. See In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Con-
duct, 347 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1977) (Karl, J., concurring).
19. Even if temporary, the step is a noteworthy one which may result in a case that could
have a major effect on the use of television in the courtroom if it reaches the Supreme Court
of the United States.
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
• ..of the press .... "
22. See note 20 supra.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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II. A DISCUSSION OF Estes v. Texas
The Court was confronted in Estes with the question of whether
Billy Sol Estes, convicted in a Texas court of swindling, was de-
prived of his fourteenth amendment right to due process 5 by the
televising and broadcasting of his trial and the pretrial proceed-
ings. 6 Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion27 depicts the spec-
tacle to which the pretrial proceedings were reduced by the presence
of the media. Cameramen roamed the courtroom at will, and at one
point there were at least twelve of them present.28 Pictures were
snapped of the advocates from behind the judge's bench. The carni-
val atmosphere29 which permeated the courtroom and surrounded
the courthouse is graphically illustrated in an article which ap-
peared in The New York Times,3" quoted, in part, in Chief Justice
Warren's concurring opinion:
A television motor van, big as an intercontinental bus, was
parked outside the courthouse and the second-floor courtroom
was a forest of equipment. Two television cameras had been set
up inside the bar and four more marked cameras were alignedjust outside the gates. A microphone stuck its 12-inch snout in-
side the jury box, now occupied by an overflow of reporters from
the press table, and three microphones confronted Judge Duna-
gan on his bench. Cables and wires snaked over the floor."
The opinion of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Clark an-
nounced that, with the electronics technology of 1965,2 televised
trials were unconstitutional in every case.33 Only three other Jus-
tices joined in the Court's opinion, making Estes a plurality deci-
sion." While the four dissenting Justices were unable to find distinct
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law ......
26. Rules of the trial judge markedly altered the manner in which the trial was filmed
from the filming of the pretrial proceedings. 381 U.S. at 537. Much of the disagreement
between the plurality and the dissenters stems from whether the coverage of the pretrial
proceedings was to be subject to review. See 381 U.S. at 610 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. 381 U.S. at 552.
28. Id.
29. Ironically, to portray the atmosphere, the Chief Justice makes use of photographs
taken at the trial-photographs he would have banned from being taken. See 381 U.S. at 586
(Warren, C.J., concurring).
30. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1962, at 46, col. 4.
31. 381 U.S. at 553.
32. Estes was decided in 1965. The Estes Court noted that "[wihen the advances in
these arts permit reporting by printing press or by television without their present hazards
to a fair trial we will have another case." Id. at 540.
33. Id. at 550-52.
34. The effect of the decision, beyond the immediate consequence to the parties in-
volved, is therefore in some doubt.
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instances of prejudice to Estes, the opinions of the Court and of
Chief Justice Warren depict a setting in which the potential for
prejudice was so great that the Court held it inherently prejudicial
to the defendant, thus eliminating the need for a showing of actual
prejudice.35 Mr. Justice Harlan, holding the critical swing vote,
joined in the plurality opinion only to the extent indicated in his
concurrence." With his typical judicial restraint, Harlan expressed
his intention to limit the ban on television in the courtroom to
"criminal trial[s] of great notoriety"37 because the case presented
no broader issue. Mr. Justice Brennan, viewing Harlan's limited
concurrence in his dissent, 3 brought home the point to be gathered
from it by stating that "today's decision is not a blanket constitu-
tional prohibition against the televising of state criminal trials."39
One of the primary factors motivating the Supreme Court of
Florida to initiate its current pilot project was the advancement in
electronic and photographic technology made since Estes,"° which
minimizes the media's intrusion into the courtroom. Perhaps the
four Justices who unqualifiedly joined the opinion, of the Court in
Estes would not have so broadened its holding to every case" had
they foreseen that technological advances would be achieved so
quickly. In any event, the Court recognized that had such advance-
ment occurred at the time of its decision, the result might have been
different. In the final paragraph of the opinion Justice Clark wrote:
It is said that the ever-advancing techniques of public communi-
cation and the adjustment of the public to its presence may bring
about a change in the effect of telecasting upon the fairness of
criminal trials. But we are not dealing here with future develop-
ments in the field of electronics. Our judgment cannot be rested
on the hypothesis of tomorrow but must take the facts as they are
presented today.2
35. The Court applied a Rideau-type rule for finding inherent prejudice, stating that
where a procedure employed by the state involves such a probability that prejudice will result
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process, no showing of actual prejudice will be
required for reversal. 381 U.S. 542. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) and discus-
sion infra, notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text.
36. 381 U.S. at 587.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 617.
39. Id.
40. For a review of some of the advancements made up to 1972 see Comment, Nebraska
Faces Videotape: The New Video Technology in Perspective, 6 CREIGHTON L. REv. 214 (1972).
41. In the minds of many critics, the Estes Court went too far in holding that the
televising of all trials, using the television technology available in 1965, was inherently preju-
dicial. For a collection of readings on courtroom access, many of which are critical of Estes,
see FREE AND FAIR-COURTROOM ACCESS AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE (K. Harwood and J.
Kitross eds. 1970).
42. 381 U.S. at 551-52.
[Vol. 32:815
CAMERAS IN COURT
Estes, then, is not an unassailable barrier to cameras in court-
rooms. The narrow applicability of the plurality opinion, the frac-
tures within the Court, as evidenced by the six written opinions, 3
and the Court's recognition of possible technological advances indi-
cate the possibility of opening the courtroom door to cameras in the
future. Today's media technology, the departure from the Court of
every member who supported the Estes decision that televised trials
were unconstitutional and the presence of three of the Estes dissen-
ters-Brennan, Stewart and White-on the Court today suggest at
least a possibility that, given the opportunity to revisit Estes, the
present Court would modify if not overrule it.
While Estes cannot be read as a total ban on cameras in court-
rooms today, an analysis of the case is an aid to understanding the
problems which may arise in Florida's experiment with cameras in
court. The Estes decision points out the disruptive effect cameras
in court may have on a judicial proceeding. In addition, the case
raises and considers "fair trial" issues created by the presence of
cameras in the courtroom. Highlighted in the plurality opinion are
four areas in which the use of television in trials could cause subtle,
even undetectable, prejudice to the defendant. These four areas are:
corruption of juror impartiality; impairment of the quality of testi-
mony; burdensome additions to a judge's responsibilities; and har-
assment of the defendant beyond interference with his constitu-
tional rights." The critics of Estes and the technological advances
in the communications media industry challenge the validity of the
Estes assessment of the impact of cameras in court on these four
areas today.
A. Corruption of Juror Impartiality"
The Estes Court found the potential impact of television on
jurors to be the most serious problem presented by media presence
in the courtroom. Indeed, the prejudice created in the minds of
jurors and prospective veniremen by news media reports of pretrial
events and judicial proceedings, as well as by the media's actual
presence in the courtroom, has been described as the crux of the free
press-fair trial controversy."
43. Of the nine Justices, only Black, Douglas and Goldberg did not write opinions in the
case.
44. 381 U.S. at 545-50.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury. ... The right is applicable to state criminal
proceedings through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louis-
iana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
46. See Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Public.
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Trial by jury, premised on the concept of impartiality, has been
a tradition in the Anglo-Saxon system of justice since the time of
the signing of the Magna Carta." In the words of Lord Coke, "every
juror ought. . . to be indifferent as he stands unsworn . . ' 48 The
first mention in American jurisprudence of juror impartiality is in
the ruling of Chief Justice John C. Marshall, presiding at the trial
of Aaron Burr for treason." Marshall recognized a distinction be-
tween a juror's "light impressions," those preconceived notions that.
would yield to the evidence brought forth in court, and his "deep
impressions," those that would not yield. 0 If the impression were
"light," under Marshall's ruling it would not corrupt impartiality.
Marshall left it to the juror to declare whether his impression was
so deep that it could not be swayed by the evidence.
The Court in Reynolds v. United States5 was faced for the first
time with an appeal of a conviction challenged for lack of juror
impartiality. The Court recognized that pretrial publicity made it
unlikely that anyone in the community in which the crime had been
committed could be found who did not have some preconceived
impression as to the guilt of the accused. Carrying Marshall's analy-
sis forward, the Court held that preconceived notions, without more,
do not corrupt juror impartiality. 2 Therefore, the defendant was
required to make a showing of actual prejudice.
ity on the Juror's Ability to be Impartial; A Plea for Reform, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 672 (1966).
The confrontation between first amendment and sixth amendment rights is unlikely to soon
abate, given the Court's decision in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The
Court held that the burden necessary to justify a prior restraint was not met by a judge who
had issued a restraining order on the news gathering and dissemination activities of reporters
covering a sensational murder case. But the Court did not hold that such prior restraints were
constitutionally impermissible in every case. See id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring). Had
the Court adopted the views of Mr. Justice Brennan a significant amount of tension between
the two rights would have been relaxed. Justice Brennan would have held that the use of prior
restraints on the freedom of the press was an unconstitutional method of enforcing the right
to a fair trial.
47. "No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any
way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment
of his peers and by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA § 39 in A. HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA:
TEXT AND COMMENTARY (1964).
48. 1 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND or, A COMMEN-
TARY UPON LrrrLzTON, 155 b. (19th ed. London 1853).
49. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)(No. 14, 692g).
50. Id. at 51. This distinction continues today. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 801-
02 (1975).
51. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
52. The impracticality of finding prospective jurors who are totally indifferent resulted
in the Reynolds rule that a finding of impartiality by the trial judge should be set aside only
where prejudice is "manifest." Id. at 156. For application of the rule, see Holt v. United




The "showing" requirement was reasserted in Stroble v.
California.53 In that case the confession of one accused of a sex-
connected murder of a six-year-old child was released to the press
by the prosecuting attorney and widely broadcast in the trial dis-
trict. The prejudicial impact of the attorney's misconduct was less-
ened by the reading of the confession into the public record at a
preliminary hearing four days later. The trial was not held until
approximately two months after the first report of the confession.
The initial spate of reports was offset by infrequent and much
milder publicity in the intervening time. The Court affirmed the
conviction because Stroble failed to show actual prejudice. Militat-
ing against a showing of prejudice were the availability of the con-
fession shortly after its release and the time for public emotion to
subside.
In Irvin v. Dowd,54 the requirement that actual prejudice be
demonstrated was weakened. The Court reiterated that to hold that
the existence of a preconceived notion, without more, rebuts the
presumption of impartiality would set an impossible standard, add-
ing that this was especially so "in these days of swift, widespread
and diverse communication." 5 However, Irvin had been tried in an
atmosphere permeated with hostility, and eight of the twelve jurors
believed him to be guilty before the start of the trial. The Court held
this to be a sufficient showing of prejudice to reverse his conviction
for lack of juror impartiality:
With his life at stake it is not asking too much that petitioner be
tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public
passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of its
members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a
belief in his guilt."
Inherent prejudice was again sufficient to reverse a conviction
in Rideau v. Louisiana,57 where a change of venue was denied after
a film of the jailed defendant's confession to a sheriff was broadcast
three times over a television station in the community. The Court
recognized that "[flor anyone who has ever watched television the
53. 343 U.s. 181 (1952).
54. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
55. Id. at 722.
56. Id. at 728.
57. 373 U.S. 723 (1963). The absolute rule of Rideau served as precedent for the Estes
Court to free the petitioner from showing actual prejudice. 381 U.S. at 544. See also Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), where petitioner's conviction was reversed without a showing
of actual prejudice because prejudice was inherent in the trial judge's failure to insulate the
jurors from the effects of massive publicity and from his failure to minimize the disruption
caused by the press in the courtroom.
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conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of
thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was
Rideau's trial, at which he pleaded guilty to murder."58
Two years after deciding Rideau the Court, considering the
problem of juror prejudice in Estes, noted that once a judge an-
nounces that a criminal trial will be televised undue community
interest focuses on the trial. The entire community "becomes inter-
ested in all the morbid details surrounding it.""5 This increases the
chance that jurors will unfairly carry into the jury box impressions
prejudicial to the defendant. 0 Underlying this conclusion was the
assumption that commercial interests would allow only the most
notorious cases to be televised." The Court also believed that, with
the eyes of a community hostile to the defendant upon them, the
jurors would feel community pressure to find the defendant guilty.
In analyzing the problems posed by cameras in court, the Court
assumed that jurors would be distracted from the evidence by their
knowledge of the cameras' presence. 2 It was also feared that in
states that did not have sequestration rules, the jurors would see on
television at home selected parts of the trial likely to be the most
damaging to the defendant and would subconsciously be influenced
by those parts.63 Finally, it was felt that new trials would be jeopard-
ized since it would be difficult to impanel a jury whose members had
not seen the previous trial.6"
Today, much of the concern with juror impartiality expressed
by the Estes Court appears to be unjustified. The idea that undue
community interest focuses on a televised trial may no longer be
valid. More television is watched today than ever before. 5 Perhaps
the continued exposure of our society to television and the part
television plays in daily life have made people less susceptible to the
media's influence, thereby lessening its prejudicial effects. In any
case, even the most popular television programs rarely capture more
than forty percent of the television audience. It is highly likely,
58. Id. at 726.
59. 381 U.S. at 545.
60. Most pretrial publicity is prejudicial to the accused. See Note, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv.
450 (1963).
61. 381 U.S. at 549-50. See Note, 43 Thx. L. REv. 992, 995 (1965).
62. 381 U.S. at 546.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 546-47.
65. The average American home watches six hours, eight minutes of television per day.
More than 71.5 million (97%) U.S. homes have television sets. Forty-five percent of these have
more than one set. A Short Course in Broadcasting, 1977 BROADCASTING Y.B. A-2.
66. For example, the show which gained the largest audience for the week of Sept. 29 to
Oct. 5, 1977, "Heavyweight Boxing," was watched by 37.3% of the viewing audience.
BROADCASTING, Oct. 10, 1977.
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then, that prospective jurors can be found who have not seen broad-
casts of pretrial events. The argument that financial requirements
of commercial interest would allow only the most sensational trials
to be televised was made before the steady gains of public television
in the last decade.6 7
Distraction of the jurors is lessened by the advanced technology
of present-day cameras. One judge, familiar with the courtroom and
believing the distraction of witnesses to be a relative matter, has
written that distractions caused by the camera may be minor in
comparison to the normal distractions inherent in a trial: restriction
of evidentiary rules, judicial reprimands, lively cross-examination
and scrutiny of the proceedings by those present in the courtroom."8
The same reasoning is applicable to jurors, and, in addition, jurors
must suffer the frequent distraction of having to leave the courtroom
for proffers of evidence objected to on grounds of inadmissibility.
While the Estes Court recognized the potential problems posed
by states without provisions for sequestration, such concern with
pressure exerted by a hostile community on a jury is unjustified
when the tool of sequestering the jury during trial is available."
Certainly the lack of a sequestration rule in one state should not bar
the televising of proceedings in states which do have such rules.
Finally, the argument that new trials would be jeopardized is
counter balanced by the statistics which indicate that a large per-
centage of the television audience will not be viewing a particular
television offering. 70 The argument also ignores the potential of judi-
cial control to relax the tension of the free press-fair trial contro-
versy. 7'
67. The number of public television stations in 1965, 88, increased to 252 in 1976. ABC's
of Radio and Television, 1977 BROADCASTING Y.B. A-1, A-7.
68. Miller, The Broadcaster's Stand: A Question of Fair Trial and Free Information, 1
J. BROADCASTING 3, (1956-57).
69. Sequestration is allowed in Florida. State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977). See also State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Rose, 271 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
70. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
71. In addition to sequestration to prevent jurors from seeing the day's trial events again
on television, there is the trial judge's inherent ability to stop the flow to the press of informa-
tion damaging to the defendant by controlling court personnel and officers of the court. Much
of the fair trial-free press controversy stems from statements which prosecuting attorneys
have made to the press. See, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). Indeed, lack of
judicial control has been cited as a primary cause of the fair trial-free press conflict. See
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A DOCUMENTED SURVEY OF MATERIALS 33-42 (1965). The
court should be able to control the behavior of court officers and media representatives during
trial proceedings to avoid any danger to the defendant. As for the dangers of televised pre-
trial proceedings being viewed by prospective jurors, brief continuances or changes in venue
can reduce the effect of prejudicial publicity.
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B. Impairment of the Quality of Testimony
The Estes Court acknowledged the difficulty a defendant would
have in proving the existence of factors which could impair the
quality of a witness' testimony. Several factors which might lead to
inaccuracy were listed: nervousness, demoralization and fright,
cockiness and embarassment. The Court also feared that witnesses
either before or after their testimony would be harassed on the street
by those who recognized them. Furthermore, the Court foresaw frus-
tration of the rule which excludes witnesses from the courtroom
while another is on the stand so that they do not hear and observe
each other's testimony. Witnesses could observe other witnesses at
home on television, even if admonished against it, and thus be
subject to subconscious shaping of their own testimony.72
Many of the foregoing objections may be cured by new elec-
tronic equipment which is much less obtrusive in the courtroom,73
and as discussed in the previous section, the distraction to witnesses
may be slight when measured against the usual disruptions in the
courtroom. 7 Witnesses will forget that cameras are present just as
they forget about the presence of stenographers and other recording
equipment frequently employed today in the courtroom.7" In addi-
tion, there is evidence to show that trial participants are less likely
to be given to personal quirks when they know they are being tele-
vised.7"
As to frustration of the sequestration rule, even when it is in-
voked the possibility always exists that an excluded witness will
learn about another's testimony." Subconscious effects cannot be
predicted with accuracy. If a trial is routine, it is unlikely that one
witness will bother to view others on television, and, even if one sees
another witness in a case in which he has a personal interest, there
is no guarantee of deliberate alteration of testimony."
The Estes Court also suggested that fear of being televised will
make some witnesses reluctant to appear." This argument ignores
the subpoena power," and it disregards one of the primary purposes
72. 381 U.S. at 547.
73. See note 40 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
75. Cf. Quiat, The Freedom of Pressure and the Explosive Canon 35, 33 RoCKY MTN. L.
REV. 11, 17 (1960) ("Newsmen feel that personnel in the court room [sic] soon forget the
presence of recording equipment in concentrating on the case.")
76. Note, Television in the Courtroom: The Florida Supreme Court Reopens the Door,
at 17 (Fall Quarter, 1976)(unpublished student note, University of Florida College of Law).
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id.
79. 381 U.S. at 547.
80. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 914.001 (1977) which reads in' pertinent part: "Subpoenas for
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of a public trial: that key witnesses unknown to the parties may
come forward and give important testimony."'
The Estes decision recognized that many of the dangers televi-
sion coverage presents to witnesses are invoked by newspaper cover-
age as well. But the Court concluded that "the circumstances and
extraneous influences intruding upon the solemn decorum of court
procedure in the televised trial are far more serious than in cases
involving only newspaper coverage." 2 To the Court, then, it is the
actual invasion of the courtroom which presents the greatest prob-
lem. Again, the problem diminishes with new equipment. In addi-
tion, the argument has been made that television may enhance the
dignity of the judiciary.83 Perhaps the placing of such stress on deco-
rum within the courtroom reveals a preoccupation with judicial cer-
emony and raises form over substance.' Certainly, the televising of
solemn and portentous occasions, such as presidential inaugura-
tions, church services and coronation ceremonies does not detract
from the dignity of these events. 5
C. Burdens on the Judge
In a criminal proceeding it is the responsibility of the judge to
ensure that the trial is fair. The Estes Court felt that the burden of
surpervising television in the courtroom added too much to that
responsibility" by requiring the judge to rule on numerous addi-
witnesses in criminal cases shall run throughout the state.
81. Miller, supra note 68, at 10.
82. 381 U.S. at 548 (emphasis added).
83. Wilson, supra note 5, at 295. "[F]ar from detracting from the dignity of the proceed-
ings, television could help ensure it. It would serve as a restraint to breaches in dignity, be
they judicial bullying, antics of counsel, or unfair treatment of the accused and witnesses.
Even the possibility that there might be television coverage would serve as a restraint." Id.
84. One does not have to entirely agree with the following to admit that pretense, at
times, may surround a judicial proceeding.
Much of the respect, even awe, in which law and lawyers are generally held by
laymen has its source in the aura of solemnity which surrounds the craft-from
the ponderous language to the musty lawbooks that line lawyers' offices, to, espe-
cially, the almost religious ritual of the courtroom itself. The late Judge Jerome
Frank used to ridicule this ceremonial solemnity-of architecture, of judges' uni-
forms, of standardized and stiffly formal court procedure-with a symbolic
phrase, "the cult of the robe." But he knew that judges and lawyers loved it
because it made them and their work, however trivial on occasion, look important
and impressive. The idea of opening a courtroom, like a ballpark or convention
hall, to television offends much of the profession less because of a fear of unfair
trials than because of a fear of detracting from the dignity of the court-and of
themselves.
Rodell, TV or No TVin Court? N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1964, § 6 (Magazine), at 103.
85. See Miller, supra note 68, at 5-6.
86. 381 U.S. at 548. Compare Estes with Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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tional questions. 7 Furthermore, judges are subject to the same
human reactions to television as laymen and would be just as likely
to be distracted from their task.When judges are elected, telecasting
could be used as a political weapon, 8 especially if the judge were
faced with the initial decision of whether to permit a telecast at all.
In deciding whether to allow proceedings to be televised, it would
be difficult for a judge to ignore the pressures the media could bring
on him, both directly and indirectly through the shaping of public
opinion.89
The concern of the Estes Court that judges would not be able
to ensure a fair trial if they also had to supervise the televising of
the proceeding is probably the least defensible of all the argu-
ments. 0 The first objection of the Court, that television in the court-
room places too great a burden on the judge, can largely be cured
by an order, similar to the one issued by the Supreme Court of
Florida, promulgating the standards governing courtroom televi-
sion." Carefully delineated standards should serve to minimize any
conflict between the media and the defendant over the physical
presence of cameras. With all the parties aware of what the court
guidelines allow, the necessity of rulings by the trial judge will be
reduced. The distractions caused by the media, as mentioned
above, are probably overstated by the Estes opinion. 2 Certainly, as
more trials are televised, the judge, who is the one trial participant
repeatedly before the cameras, will become accustomed to the cam-
era's presence and the distractions it may cause. Dangers from polit-
ical use of the camera may exist to a certain extent but such dangers
are probably exaggerated in Estes. In Florida, the pilot program has
eliminated the danger of a press attack against a judge for refusal
to allow televising of a trial since all trials are open to the media at
its discretion.
In any event, in the context of a fair trial analysis, in the rare
instances when a defendant is prejudiced by a judge's inability to
87. See 381 U.S. at 536-37 (numerous pretrial rulings in Estes detailed).
88. Perhaps televised judicial proceedings are more justified where judges are elected,
since voters would be given the opportunity to observe and evaluate their performances. Note,
supra note 76, at 19.
89. 381 U.S. at 548-49.
90. In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the Supreme Court came near to
holding that a judge is expected to be a person of fortitude and never seriously affected by
any outside influence. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 457 (1971).
91. See In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Con-
duct, 347 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam).
92. See Miller, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
93. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct,
347 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1977)(per curiam).
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control media coverage, the defendant's conviction may, on appeal,
be reversed for lack of a fair trial. The conviction of Dr. Sam Shep-
pard was reversed in Sheppard v. Maxwell" largely on the basis of
the trial judge's failure to minimize disruptive actions of the press
and his failure to insulate the jurors from the pressures of the com-
munications media.
D. Harassment of the Defendant
The Estes Court felt that the presence of television in the court-
room would constitute a form of mental harassment of the defen-
dant resembling a police line-up or the third degree. 5 The Court
implied that the defendant's right to privacy would be threatened
and his concentration broken."0 Even further, the Court feared that
television broadcasts would intrude upon the defendant's confiden-
tial relationship with his attorney. Finally, the Court speculated
that the pressures of paid sponsorship would result in the selective
telecasting of only the more sensational trials, which would heighten
the possibility of prejudice against an unpopular accused.
Certainly the Court's analogy to the third degree is exagger-
ated. The focusing of the lens on a defendant cannot begin to com-
pare with such an affront to human dignity as the "third degree"
has been described to be. 7 With the new equipment available for
televising or videotaping trials, the defendant will probably not be
aware of the camera focused on him so that whatever concentration
he can muster during the ordeal of a trial may continue unbroken.
A claim of abridgment of privacy rights would be difficult to sus-
tain,9" particularly since defendants accused of notorious crimes
cannot expect to remain out of the public eye. 9 As for the argument
that the necessity of paid sponsorship will result in broadcasts of
94. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
95. 381 U.S. at 549.
96. The inevitable close-ups of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal
of his trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his
ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him-sometimes the difference
between life and death-dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of
wide public surveillance.
Id.
97. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966).
98. Generally, the right has been limited to matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
713 (1976); accord, Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
99. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity in a notorious case which involved the murder-torture by the defendant of his minor
children, said, "[olne who is reasonably suspected of murdering his children cannot expect
to remain anonymous." Id. at 303.
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only the most sensational cases, the decision ignores the potential
of public television, which may well televise routine trials. The deci-
sion also overlooks standards which might be enforced to protect the
attorney-client relationship.'
The simple fact is that the Estes decision is too broad to stand
unmodified. It ignores the potential of public television, the televis-
ing of civil trials' and the use of television in routine trials. The
least defensible of its fears is that interference with the independ-
ence of the judiciary will result. The fear of the inability of a witness
to testify accurately fails to account for the present technological
sophistication of videotape equipment which will minimize the wit-
ness' perception that the camera lens is focused upon him. For many
witnesses the experience of testifying in a court of law is a foreign
one and, if the presence of the television is not given undue atten-
tion by the officers of the court,0 2 it will not even be noticed by most
witnesses, attentive as they must be to everything else that occurs
in a trial. Furthermore, Estes ignores the tools that the trial judge
has at his disposal to control the media's presence. Much of the
bother to which a defendant will be subjected is probably over-
stated. Finally, the Court's unwillingness to find inherent prejudice
in two recent decisions' involving possible juror impartiality indi-
cates that much of the Estes Court's objections to television and its
effects on juror impartiality may no longer be valid.
ImI. THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
The constitutional right to a public trial protects an accused
from the use of the courts as an instrument of persecution. 04 The
100. See In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Con-
duct, 347 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1977)(per curiam).
101. See Ripley, An Argument for Television in the Civil Courtroom, 12 J. BROADCASTING
23 (1968).
102. See note 71 supra. For an insider's view of manipulation of the press by an attorney
see Gertz, A Lawyer "Uses" the Press in MASS MEDIA AND THE LAw, FREEDOM AND RESTRAINT
161 (D. Clark and E. Hutchinson eds. 1970).
103. In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), members of the jury had learned from
news accounts about the defendant's prior felony convictions and facts about the crime with
which he was charged. The Court reiterated that jury exposure to information damaging to a
defendant does not presumptively deprive him of due process. Since Murphy had failed to
show actual prejudice from the voir dire or inherent prejudice from the totality of the circum-
stances, his conviction was upheld. Prior cases in which inherent prejudice had been found
were characterized as involving "a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press
coverage." Id. at 798. The same standard was applied in Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433,
440 (Fla. 1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), where it was held that a great amount of publicity
given to a crime or an accused is not enough to raise a presumption of juror impartiality.
104. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). The guarantee was undoubtedly provided to
prevent excesses similar to those of the English Star Chamber, the French monarchy's abuse
of the lettre de cachet and the Spanish Inquisition. Id. at 268-69.
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public, however, also has an interest in trials.
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
public property. If a transcript of the court proceedings had been
published, we supposed none would claim that the judge could
punish the publisher for contempt. And we can see no difference
though the conduct of the attorneys, of the jury, or even of the
judge himself, may have reflected on the court. Those who see
and hear what transpired can report it with impunity. There is
no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distin-
guished from other institutions of democratic government, to
suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings
before it.105
Distinguished legal scholars have hailed the openness of judicial
proceedings as bestowing a number of benefits on society. 10 Open-
ness allows the public to observe proceedings firsthand and judge
the performance of the court and its officers. It is likely to improve
the quality of the testimony, and the attendant publicity may serve
to notify unknown witnesses who may step forward with relevant
evidence. Surely it inspires the trial participants to perform their
duties conscientiously.
The Estes decision is criticized' 7 for ignoring these benefits to
the public's interest in a public trial. Television certainly will ena-
ble the public to better understand what goes on in the court. The
right to a public trial in a state proceeding is derived from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment."8 In determining the
scope of the right, the Supreme Court has looked to the common law
and the widely followed practices in the United States, 1 9 which
include the public's right to attend trials. Considering the limita-
tions (e.g. size, geographic accessibility) of the courtroom, should
not the public have a right to televised proceedings as a means to
turn trials into truly public events? The increased public awareness
of what goes on inside the courtroom resulting from the televising
of trials should ultimately serve to protect the defendant from arbi-
trary abuse at the hands of the judicial system.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF Estes
The most critical remark to be made about the Estes decision
105. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 37.4 (1947).
106. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 372-73 (10th ed. London
1787)(lst ed. London 1765); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
107. Ripley, supra note 101, at 27-31; see Miller, supra note 68, at 52.
108. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272-73 (1948).
109. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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is that it may have served to abridge first amendment rights."10 In
fact, there was no clear first amendment claim raised in Estes. As
Justice Stewart pointed out, the problem in Estes was solely one of
due process,"' and the approach of the Court shows that the issue
was limited to due process considerations."' Justice Stewart, how-
ever, was disturbed by the suggestion in the plurality opinion that
there are limitations upon the public's right to know what goes on
in the courts. He felt that "the proposition that non participants in
a trial might get the 'wrong impression' from unfettered reporting"
smacked of censorship,"' the protection against which lies at the
heart of the first amendment."'
The plurality opinion and the two concurring opinions in Estes
were at pains to explain how the decision was not inconsistent with
the freedoms of speech and press."' They argued that so long as
representatives of the media are allowed to attend courtroom pro-
ceedings, with the same right accorded to the general public, and
then allowed to report their observations, no interference with first
110. But see Emerson, supra note 90, at 450, where the author argues that restrictions
on the communications media in the interest of effective management of a judicial proceeding
have never been thought to constitute an abridgment of first amendment freedom of expres-
sion.
111. It is a problem rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We deal here with matters subject to continuous and unforeseeable
change-the techniques of public communication. In an area where all the varia-
bles may be modified tomorrow, I cannot at this time rest my determination on
hypothetical possibilities not present in the record of this case. There is no claim
here based upon any right guaranteed by the First Amendment. But it is impor-
tant to remember that we move in an area touching the realm of free communica-
tion, and for that reason, if for no other, I would be wary of imposing any per se
rule which, in the light of future technology, might serve to stifle or abridge true
First Amendment rights.
381 U.S. at 603-04 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. "In short, the question here is not the validity of either Canon 35 of the American
Bar Association or Canon 28 of the State Bar of Texas, but only whether petitioner was tried
in a manner which comports with the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 381 U.S. at 535.
113. 381 U.S. at 615 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
114. Prior restraints are "the essence of censorship." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). Emerson said this about censorship and prior restraints:
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of
subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far
wider range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; sup-
pression by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression
through a criminal process; the procedures do not require attention to the safe-
guards of the criminal process; the system allows less opportunity for public
appraisal and criticism; the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the
history of all censorship shows.
Emerson, supra note 90, at 506.




amendment freedoms occurs. This theory does not take into account
the limitations of most courtrooms. It is not inconceivable that
someone with an interest in preventing the report of a trial could
pack a small courtroom and thereby keep the press outside. Also not
taken into account is the fact that any medium of communication
is entitled to first amendment protections and its presence should
be presumed to be justified."'
The first amendment is designed to protect the free flow of
information and ideas."7 It has been consistently held that the pre-
sumption in favor of preserving first amendment freedoms is neces-
sary to ensure that the public be presented with every side of an
issue fully exposed. The need for full exposure of information and
ideas is especially important in a democratic society, where it is
critical that the electorate be kept informed."' Where first amend-
ment freedoms and the administration of justice have conflicted in
other settings, the first amendment freedom has been given the
fullest measure of protection."9 For example, the Supreme Court of
the United States has never upheld a contempt citation for expres-
sion critical of a court. The issue has been faced in a number of
cases,' 0 but each time the' Court has allowed freedom of discussion
to prevail and reversed the contempt citation. Thus, the Court has
been determined to extend a high degree of protection to the discus-
sion of administration of justice. 2' In keeping with the necessity of
an informed electorate, it would seem that an even higher premium
would be placed on open discussion of court proceedings in a system
where circuit court judges are popularly elected.
If every medium of communication is entitled to first amend-
ment protection, provided it conveys worthwhile information, why
should television in the courtroom not be afforded the same
protection? The first amendment argument for allowing electronic
media in the courtroom should prevail if, as the new technology has
116. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
117. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
118. "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance; And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (August 4, 1822),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
119. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESs (1968); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL: FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
(1967).
120. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
121. Emerson, supra note 90, at 456.
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shown, disruption of the orderly processes of the court can be kept
to a minimum. If the Court is presented with a case for television
in the courtroom set in first amendment claims, perhaps it will
rethink Estes.
V. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEDIA
Much of the success of the pilot project implemented by the
Supreme Court of Florida depends upon the media and its conduct
in televising trials. During the one year that the television industry
is allowed into the courtroom, it must prove that it can and will
conduct itself in a manner that will neither disrupt judicial proceed-
ings nor deny a defendant his fair trial rights.
With greater freedom goes greater responsibility, and there is
no doubt that the press has been given great freedom in many re-
spects. For example, it is virtually free to publish whatever it
likes. 22 Prior restraints on speech and publication are "the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights."'2 3 In fact, the Supreme Court has refused to uphold every
prior restraint on the press that it has considered. 2' A good argu-
ment can even be made for invalidating prior restraints in cases
where they are ordered for the protection of a defendant's fair trial
rights, even though these have been described as the greatest rights
of our judicial system. 2 ' The press is also given wide protection in
many instances from post-publication sanctions to prevent the fu-
ture exercise of first amendment rights from being chilled.'
122. It appears that only the publication, during wartime, of secrets relating to national
security may be restrained. Relying on Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963),
the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion stated: "Any system of prior restraints of expres-
sion comes to this Court bearing heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). But see Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) where the Court states: "When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not
be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right."
123. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
124. See id.; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697 (1931). Florida courts have also invalidated the prior restraints that have come before
them. State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977);
State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
125. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 572 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. For example, a public official cannot recover damages for defamatory falsehoods
relating to his official conduct unless he can prove that the statement was made with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This conditional privilege to publish defamatory criti-
cism has been extended to include public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967), In cases of defamation of private citizens, the states are forbidden by first amend-
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Perhaps the most realistic concern about media use of televised
courtroom proceedings is that selective portions of the proceedings,
usually the most sensationalized, will be presented on evening news
reports.' 2 Whether these excerpts would have greater impact on the
public than the artist sketches currently used by news commenta-
tors is questionable.18 Nevertheless, because of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission's role as overseer'n of the television industry
and the "public trustee" function of the licensed broadcaster, the
obligation of news broadcasters to maintain high journalistic stan-
dards may be even greater than that of newspaper editors.'30 As
Chief Justice Burger said in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee:
The regulatory scheme evolved slowly, but very early the licen-
see's role developed in terms of a "public trustee" charged with
the duty of fairly and impartially informing the public audience.
In this structure the Commission acts in essence as an "overseer,"
but the initial and primary responsibility for fairness, balance,
and objectivity rests with the licensee. This role of the govern-
ment as an "overseer" and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the
public interest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic "free
agent" call for a delicate balancing of competing interests.
...[S]o long as a licensee meets its "public trustee" obli-
gation to provide balanced coverage of issues and events, it has
broad discretion to decide how that obligation will be met. "'
It is evident, then, that we place great trust in the media. The
framers of the Constitution by including the first amendment rights
assured that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open.' ' 32 Our interest in maintaining an unrestricted flow
of ideas and information outweighs the occasional abuse which we
allow to occur under the umbrella of the first amendment. 3 The
Supreme Court of Florida has opened up a whole new avenue for the
communication of information about its state court system. The
ment principles to impose liability without fault. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
127. See Note supra note 76, at 16.
128. Id. at 17.
129. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (1970).
130. Wilson, supra note 5, at 295.
131. 412 U.S. 94, 117-19 (1973).
132. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
133. James Madison said: "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
everything; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press." 4 J. ELLioTr,
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEwRL CONSTITImON
571 (2d ed. 1836).
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media must minimize any disruptive influence it might have in the
courtroom and live up to its professional responsibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
A complex reaction of constitutional principles has been set in
motion by the allowance of television into Florida's courtrooms. For
the pilot project to be extended and given permanent status the
components of the system must each do their part. The press must
be responsible, the judges must be strong, jurors must be impartial
and officers of the court must resist the temptation to use the media
to their own benefit. The final question of whether televised trials
will meet constitutional muster will remain unresolved until it is
put before the Supreme Court of the United States. If a defendant
is convicted during a televised trial'34 and the conviction is affirmed
in the state courts, the case is likely to be accepted for review by
the Supreme Court. Only then will we know whether television will
be able to slip, for good, through the crack in the courtroom door
left open by Estes.
POSTSCRIPT
As this article goes to press, the present status of photographic
and electronic recording equipment in Florida's courtrooms is un-
certain. The one year pilot program permitting coverage of judicial
proceedings by electronic media and still photographers terminated
at 11:59 p.m. on June 30, 1978. On March 3, 1978 attorneys repre-
senting Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., requested a contin-
uation of full media coverage beyond the June 30th deadline. Re-
sponding to that request, on May 11, 1978, the Supreme Court of
Florida, in a four to three per curiam decision, refused to extend the
terminaton date. In Re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Flor-
ida, Inc.t In denying Post-Newsweek's petition for an extention of
the pilot program, the court promulgated a procedure whereby in-
terested parties, both in favor and opposed to media presence in the
courtroom, could submit written arguments and supporting materi-
als.
The court will evaluate the desirability of electronic media cov-
erage of courtroom procedures beginning July 1, 1978, the deadline
for submitting arguments. Whether the Code of Judicial Conduct
will be modified to permit television cameras in court facilities on
134. Fifteen year old Ronald Zamora has been convicted of first degree murder during a
televised trial in Dade County Circuit Court. Circuit Court Case No. 77-25123A. On February
27, 1978, an appeal was filed with the Third District Court of Appeal, No. 77-2566.
t 358 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1978).
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a permanent basis hinges on the results of these deliberations. While
the ultimate resolution remains open, the favorable language used
by the dissenting justices who advocated a continuation of the pro-
gram until a final decision could be reached, perhaps portends in
which direction the court will move. Justice Boyd, in his dissent,
discussed the probable renewal of permitting cameras in court and
argued that any temporary termination would have a disruptive and
frustrating effect on a program "which at this time appears to be
generally accepted in the State."tt -Editors-
tt Id. at 1362.
